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Abstract 
Why do members of the public disagree—sharply and persistently—about facts on which expert 
scientists largely agree? We designed a study to test a distinctive explanation: the cultural cognition of 
scientific consensus. The “cultural cognition of risk” refers to the tendency of individuals to form risk 
perceptions that are congenial to their values. The study presents both correlational and experimental evi-
dence confirming that cultural cognition shapes individuals’ beliefs about the existence of scientific con-
sensus, and the process by which they form such beliefs, relating to climate change, the disposal of nuc-
lear wastes, and the effect of permitting concealed possession of handguns. The implications of this dy-
namic for science communication and public policy-making are discussed. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the steady and massive accumulation of scientific evidence, the American public is as di-
vided about climate change today as it was ten years ago (Pew Research Center 2009; Newport 2008). 
Nor is this the only issue on which the emergence of consensus, or near consensus, among scientists has 
failed to achieve anything close to that among members of the public: the safety of nuclear power (Slovic, 
Flynn & Layman 1991; Barke & Jenkins-Smith 1993); the toxicity of arsenic, radon and other groundwa-
ter chemicals (Sunstein 2005); the health consequences of vaccinating school girls against the human pa-
pillomavirus (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic in press)—all have featured intense political con-
testation over empirical issues on which technical experts largely agree. 
Not all policy disputes turn on issues amenable to scientific investigation, of course, so no one 
would or should expect that what scientists have to say will resolve every conflict. But when empirical 
assessments of risk and risk abatement are exactly what members of the public are fighting about, why is 
the prevailing opinion of scientists—on questions only they are equipped to answer—so infrequently 
treated as decisive? 
Myriad theories have been advanced for the limited influence of science in formulating the fac-
tual basis for public policy debates, but none seems complete. If the answer were that members of the 
public are simply less informed than experts (Iriwn & Wynne 1996), one would expect disagreement on 
issues like climate change to abate in the face of widespread dissemination of scientific findings. Trust in 
experts varies across groups, and laypersons often evaluate information about risks and benefits with cri-
teria that differ from those used by scientists (Slovic 2000; Jenkins-Smith 2001). Yet public debates rarely 
feature open resistance to science; the parties to such disputes are much more likely to advance diametri-
cally opposed claims about what the scientific evidence really shows. The problem, it seems, is not that 
members of the public are unexposed or indifferent to what scientists say, but rather that they disagree 
about what scientists are telling them. 
We present evidence in support of a novel explanation for the limited policy-shaping power of 
scientific opinion: the cultural cognition of expert consensus. The cultural cognition of risk is a theory 
 
  
that helps to explain public disagreement about the significance of empirical evidence generally (Kahan, 
Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006). The theory posits a collection of psychological mechanisms that dispose 
individuals selectively to credit or dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that fit values they share with oth-
ers. We designed a study, including both correlational and experimental elements, to test the hypothesis 
that mechanisms of cultural cognition extend to evidence of what scientific expert opinion is on climate 
change and other risks. 
2. Theoretical Background and Conjectures 
2.1. Cultural Cognition 
Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to fit their perceptions of risk and related 
factual beliefs to their shared moral evaluations of putatively dangerous activities. The cultural cognition 
thesis asserts that individuals are psychologically disposed to believe that behavior they (and their peers) 
find honorable is socially beneficial, and behavior they find base socially detrimental (Kahan, Braman, 
Monahan, Callahan & Peters 2010). 
Cultural cognition is the descendent of two other theories. The first is the cultural theory of risk 
associated with the work of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982). The cultural theory of risk posits 
that individuals can be expected to form risk perceptions that reflect and reinforce one or another idea-
lized “way of life.” Persons whose values are relatively hierarchical and individualistic will thus be skep-
tical of environmental risks, the widespread acceptance of which would justify restricting commerce and 
industry, activities that people with these values prize; persons with more egalitarian and communitarian 
values, in contrast, resent commerce and industry as forms of noxious self-seeking productive of unjust 
disparity, and thus readily accept that such activities are dangerous and worthy of regulation. (Dake, 
1991; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Rayner 1992; Adams 1995). The second theory is the “psychometric 
paradigm.” This position identifies recurring cognitive and affective dynamics that cause individuals to 
form risk perceptions systematically different from ones we might expect if such individuals were behav-
ing consistently with rational decision theory (Slovic 2000). 
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Cultural cognition attempts to fuse the cultural theory of risk and the psychometric paradigm in 
ways that permit each to answer questions posed by but not satisfactorily addressed by the other. The psy-
chometric paradigm thus furnishes an account of the individual-level mechanisms through which cultural 
values shape risk perceptions: the opposing outlooks characteristic of hierarchy and egalitarianism, indi-
vidualism and communitarianism, imbue putatively dangerous activities with resonances (positive and 
negative) reflected in affective appraisals of risk (Jenkins-Smith 2001; Peters, Burraston, & Mertz 2004); 
invest instances of harm (or adverted harm) with significance, making them worthy of note and amenable 
to recollection in the way that the availability heuristic presupposes (Kahan & Braman 2003); trigger the 
analogical associations that result in biased assimilation of information (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Cohen & 
Slovic 2009; Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979); underwrite the social affinities that make others credible and 
trustworthy sources of risk information (Earle & Cvetkovich 1995; Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & 
Slovic in press); and create identity-protective motivations to conform one’s beliefs to those of like-
minded others in order to avoid dissonance and protect social standing (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & 
Mertz 2007; Cohen 2003).1 For its part, cultural theory remedies the psychometric paradigm with a 
much-needed theory of individual differences: the interaction of values with the psychological mechan-
isms featured in the psychometric position explain how one and the same dynamic—whether affect, 
availability, biased assimilation, source credibility, or others—can nevertheless produce diametrically 
opposed risk perceptions in different people and indeed intense forms of polarization across groups of 
persons. By experimental and other empirical modes of investigation, such processes have been shown to 
generate differences in perception of myriad putative sources of risk, from nuclear power to guns (Kahan, 
Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007), from nanotechnology to vaccination of school girls for HPV (Ka-
han, Braman, Slovic, Gastil & Cohen 2009; Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic in press). 
                                       
 
1 The proponents of the cultural theory of risk have (boldly and skillfully) presented a functionalist account of the 
means by which culture, as they conceive it, affects the formation of risk perceptions (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 
1990; Douglas 1986), a feature of the theory that others have criticized (Boholm 2003). Cultural cognition, in con-
trast, posits that culture is connected to perceptions of risk and other facts that individuals understand to bear on 
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2.2. Perceptions of expert consensus 
Of course, laypeople are not in a position either to investigate for themselves or fully to under-
stand the technical data compiled by scientific researchers on risks of these sorts. They must therefore 
turn for assistance to experts. One might thus anticipate (or at least hope) that regardless of the tendency 
of predispositions and biased information processing to push people of opposing cultural outlooks apart, 
the need of all them for expert guidance would cause them to gravitate toward the consensus positions 
among scientists. 
The difficulty for this suggestion, however, is that it assumes individuals of diverse outlooks will 
by and large agree on what scientific consensus is. The process by which individuals form beliefs about 
expert opinion might itself be subject to the dynamics of cultural cognition. If so, individuals’ perceptions 
of scientific consensus will come to fit their cultural predispositions toward risk generally. 
Cultural cognition might be expected to shape beliefs about expert consensus through the interac-
tion of values and the “availability heuristic” (Kahneman & Tversky 1982). Imagine that when individu-
als consider an issue like climate change they perform what amounts to a mental survey of experts they 
have observed offering an opinion on this issue. The impact “scientific consensus” will have on their 
thinking will thus turn on how readily they can recall instances of experts taking positions one way or the 
other. The cultural cognition thesis predicts that individuals will more readily recall instances of experts 
taking the position that is consistent with their cultural predisposition than ones taking positions inconsis-
tent with it. 
A cultural availability effect of this sort could result from the influence of other mechanisms of 
cultural cognition. To start, cultural cognition influences perceptions of credibility. Individuals more rea-
dily impute expert knowledge and trustworthiness to information sources whom they perceive as sharing 
their worldviews and deny the same to those whose worldviews they perceive as different from theirs 
(Siegrist, Cvetkovic & Roth 2000; Earle & Cvetkovich 1995; Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic in 
                                                                                                                           
 
their welfare through discrete psychological processes, operating at the individual level (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, 
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press). As a result, information sources who share their worldviews will be overrepresented in individu-
als’ mental inventories of experts. If individuals observe that a view they are predisposed to believe is in 
fact espoused by a disproportionate share of the information sources whom individuals recognize to be 
“experts” by virtue of such a cultural affinity—as could happen if these putative experts are also subject 
to forces of cultural cognition—individuals of opposing outlooks will end up with different impressions 
of what “most” credible experts believe.  
Even if there is no discernable correlation between experts’ positions and those experts‘ per-
ceived values, however, other mechanisms might cause individuals of opposing worldviews to form op-
posingly skewed mental inventories of expert opinion. For example, individuals tend to search out infor-
mation congenial to their cultural predispositions (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Cohen & Slovic 2009; Schulz-
Hardt, Frey & Lithgens 2000). Accordingly, we might expect individuals to work harder to find expert 
opinion supportive of their existing, culturally informed perceptions of risk than they do to find expert 
opinion that challenges those perceptions. 
Finally, even if biased searching is removed from the equation, biased assimilation could generate 
culturally valenced availability effects on perceptions of expert views. Confronted with a purported expert 
source, individuals must decide whether that source really does possess expertise before they can deter-
mine whether and how to update their mental inventory of expert positions. The same tendency individu-
als have to attend to information in a biased way that reinforces their priors could lead them to form bi-
ased assessments of the authority and knowledge of putative experts in a manner that fits their predisposi-
tions. This process, too, would lead individuals of opposing outlooks to arrive at radically different results 
when they conjure examples of “expert opinion” on particular issues. 
On this account, then, what most scientists believe is simply another empirical fact no different 
from any other that bears on a disputed question of risk. As such, scientific consensus cannot be expected 
to counteract the polarizing effects of cultural cognition because apprehension of it will necessarily occur 
                                                                                                                           
Gastil & Slovic in press; DiMaggio 1997).  
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through the same social psychological mechanisms that shape individuals’ perceptions of every other 
manner of fact. 
3. Study 
3.1. Overview 
We designed a study to test the hypothesis that cultural cognition shapes perceptions of scientific 
consensus. That study involved two parts. The first was a correlational one, in which we measured cultu-
rally diverse subjects’ perceptions of scientific consensus. The aim was to test whether distribution of 
views of scientific consensus across diverse issues fit the pattern one would expect on the basis of the 
type of cultural availability effect described in the last section. The second part of the study was an expe-
riment designed to test for the existence of a particular mechanism that would explain how members of 
culturally diverse groups could end up forming opposing mental inventories of expert opinion. Using a 
between-subjects design, the experiment examined whether subjects’ perceptions of an information 
source’s expertise is conditional on the fit between the subjects’ predispositions and the position that the 
putative expert espouses on a particular risk. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1. Sample 
The study was administered on-line to a broadly representative sample of 1,500 U.S. adults be-
tween July 20 and July 28, 2009. Subjects were recruited by Polimetrix, Inc., a public opinion research 
firm that conducts on-line surveys and experiments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers 
and commercial customers (including political campaigns). Polimetrix used stratification methods de-
signed to generate a sample demographically comparable to the adult U.S. population. The response rate 
was 55.5%. The final sample was 54% female, 71% white, and 11.3% African-American. The average 
age was 47 years. Median household income for the sample was $40,000 to $49,000, and the median edu-
cational level was “some college.”,  
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3.2.2. Cultural Worldview Measures 
We measured subjects’ cultural values with items used in previous studies of cultural cognition 
(Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic in press; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Cohen 2009; Kahan, 
Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007).2 These items characterize subjects’ cultural worldviews along two 
cross-cutting dimensions: Hierarchy-egalitarianism (“Hierarchy”) and Individualism-communitarianism 
(“Individualism”). The former set of items indicate attitudes toward social orderings that connect authori-
ty to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such as gender, 
race, and class (e.g., “Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine”; “We need to dramatically 
reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women”). The 
latter indicate attitudes toward social orderings that expect individuals to secure their own well-being 
without assistance or interference from society versus those that assign society the obligation to secure 
collective welfare and the power to override competing individual interests (e.g., “The government inter-
feres far too much in our everyday lives”; “The government should do more to advance society's goals, 
even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals”). For all items, subjects indicated 
agreement or disagreement on a six-point scale. 
For this study, we used short-form versions of Hierarchy and Individualism, each of which con-
sisted of six items.3 Like the full-form versions, the two six-item sets formed reliable scales (Hierarchy, α 
= 0.87; Individualism, α = 0.81), the items of which loaded appropriately on two separate factors, which 
were used as predictors for the study.  
3.2.2. Correlational Component: Measures and Hypotheses 
Subjects were instructed to “read a series of statements” and indicate with respect to each 
“whether you think most expert scientists agree with the statement, most expert scientists disagree with 
                                       
2 These items present refinements designed to respond to various criticisms of measures historically used in the cul-
tural theory of risk (Marris, Langford & O’Riordan 1998; Sjöberg 1998; Sjöberg 1997; Kahan, in press).  
3 The cultural worldview items used for the study, along with other items from the study instrument, are reproduced 
in the Appendix. 
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the statement, or expert scientists are divided in their views.” The list (without the item identifiers) in-
cluded: 
GWREAL. Global temperatures are increasing. 
GWHUMAN. Human activity is causing global warming. 
NUKE. Radioactive wastes from nuclear power can be safely disposed of in deep underground storage fa-
cilities. 
GUN. Permitting adults without criminal records or histories of mental illness to carry concealed handguns 
in public decreases violent crime. 
These statements were selected on two grounds. First, they embody risk assessments or (in the 
case of climate change) risk-related facts over which culturally diverse subjects were expected to disag-
ree. In previous studies, Hierarchy and Individualism had been shown to predict a propensity to believe 
that so-called “concealed carry” laws reduce the risk of crime, and a propensity to disbelieve that climate 
change and nuclear power present environmental dangers (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007). 
Consistent with the “cultural availability” hypothesis, then, we predicted that individuals who are relative-
ly hierarchical and individualistic would be more disposed than ones who are relatively egalitarian and 
communitarian to have formed the impression that “most expert scientists agree” with the statement ex-
pressed in GUN and that “most expert scientists disagree” with the statements expressed in GWREAL, 
GWHUMAN, and NUKE. 
Second, each of these statements reflected a position either in line or at odds with a U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences “expert consensus report.” An NAS report has endorsed the propositions reflected 
in GWREAL and GWHUMAN (National Research Council Committee on Analysis of Global Change 
Assessments 2007). Accordingly, we expected that with respect to these statements egalitarian and com-
munitarian subjects would be the ones more likely to report impressions—“most expert scientists 
agree”—consistent with the NAS “expert consensus” positions. The NAS has also issued a report endors-
ing the proposition reflected in NUKE (National Research Council, Board on Radioactive Waste Man-
agement 1990). Here, then, we expected relatively hierarchical and individualistic subjects to be more 
likely to form the impression—again, “most expert scientists agree”—that was reflected in an NAS “ex-
pert consensus” report. On the effect of “concealed carry” laws, the NAS has issued a report finding (over 
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one dissent, which took a position consistent with GUN) that the numerous econometric studies on the 
issue permitted no confident conclusion either way on whether such laws increase or decrease crime (Na-
tional Research Council Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms 2004). Ac-
cordingly, we predicted that with respect to GUN, egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individual-
ists would both be inclined to report impressions of expert opinion inconsistent with the NAS “expert 
consensus report” but in opposing directions (“most . . . disagree” and “most . . . agree,” respectively). 
We wanted to form hypotheses about culturally valenced beliefs that could be compared to posi-
tions reflected in NAS “consensus reports” to help validate our interpretation of results from the correla-
tional part of the study. As explained, we anticipated that the impressions formed by hierarchical and in-
dividualistic subjects, on the one hand, and by relatively egalitarian and communitarian ones, on the oth-
er, would selectively converge and diverge from NAS “expert consensus” positions in a pattern consistent 
with these groups’ respective predispositions toward risk. The NAS reports might themselves, of course, 
be imperfect reflections of the predominant opinion of expert scientists. But if subjects’ cultural predispo-
sitions better predict their impressions of scientific opinion than do the NAS “expert consensus reports,” 
we believe it is more plausible to infer that both hierarchical individualists and egalitarian communita-
rians are fitting their perceptions of scientific consensus to their predispositions than that either has some 
advantage over the other in discerning what “most expert scientists” really believe.  
We did not form hypotheses about the exact size of the disparities of the perceptions of expert 
consensus on these issues. Nevertheless, consistent with the proposition that cultural dissensus on risk 
derives from culturally opposing perceptions of expert consensus, we did predict that in no case would a 
majority of subjects holding either hierarchical and individualistic values or egalitarian and communita-
rian ones report believing that “most expert scientists” disagreed with the position associated with these 
groups’ respective predispositions. In addition, we predicted that differences in the perceptions of consen-
sus associated with holding of these respective combinations values would be of a magnitude comparable 
to the levels of disagreement surrounding these issues outside of the laboratory, thereby furnishing sup-
port for the inference that culturally grounded differences in beliefs about the state of scientific opinion 
make a real-world contribution to such dissensus. 
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3.2.3. Experimental Component: Measures and Hypotheses 
In the experimental component of the study, each subject was instructed to “[i]magine a close 
friend told you he or she was undecided on” the risks associated with climate change, geologic isolation 
of nuclear waste , or concealed carry laws. 
The friend tells you that he or she is planning to read a book about the issue but before taking the 
time to do so would like to get your opinion on whether the author seems like a knowledgeable 
and trustworthy expert. 
The subject was shown a picture of the (fictional) author, who was depicted as a member of the National 
Academy of Sciences who had earned a Ph.D. in a pertinent field from one elite university and who was 
now on the faculty of another (Figure 1). In addition, the subject was shown an excerpt from the author’s 
book, the position of which on the risk issue in question—whether the risk was high or low, well-founded 
or speculative—was randomly manipulated (Figure 2). The subject then indicated on a six-point scale 
how strongly he or she disagreed or agreed with the statement,  
“I believe the author is a trustworthy and knowledgeable expert on [“global warming,” ““nuclear 
power,” or “gun control”]. 
The hypothesis for the experiment was that the likelihood of agreement that the featured author 
was a trustworthy and knowledgeable expert would be conditional on the fit between the author’s as-
signed position and subjects’ own cultural predispositions on the issue in question. Hence, the more hie-
rarchical and individualist individuals were, the more likely they would be to agree, and the more egalita-
rian and communitarian the less likely they would be to agree, when the author was assigned the “low 
risk” position on either climate change, nuclear waste disposal, or concealed carry laws. We expected the 
patterns to be revered when the author was assigned the “high risk” position. 
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Robert Linden 
Position: Professor 
of Meteorology, 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology 
Education: Ph.D., 
Harvard University 
Memberships:  
• American 
Meteorological 
Society 
• National Academy of 
Sciences 
 
Oliver Roberts 
Position: Professor 
of Nuclear Engineering, 
University of California, 
Berkeley 
Education: Ph.D., 
Princeton University 
Memberships:  
• American Association 
of Physics 
• National Academy of 
Sciences 
Is this a knowledgeable and credible  expert on ... ?
 
James Williams 
Position: Professor 
of Criminology, Stanford 
University 
Education: Ph.D., Yale 
University 
Memberships:  
• American Society of 
Criminologists 
• National Academy of 
Sciences 
Global Warming Gun ControlNuclear Power  
Figure 1. Fictional book authors. These fictional individuals were identified as the authors of books on the risks of 
climate change, of nuclear power generation, and of laws permitting citizens to carry concealed handguns in public. 
The position they took on those risks, as reflected in book excerpts (Figure 2) was experimentally manipulated, and 
subjects were instructed to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed that the pictured individual was a knowledgea-
ble and trustworthy expert. 
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 High Risk Low Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate Change 
“It is now beyond reasonable scientific dispute 
that human activity is causing ‘global warm-
ing’ and other dangerous forms of climate 
change. Over the past century, atmospheric con-
centration of carbon dioxide (CO2)—called a 
“greenhouse gas” because of its contribution to 
trapping heat—has increased to historically un-
precedented levels. Scientific authorities at all 
major universities agree that the source of this 
increase is human industrial activity. They agree 
too that higher C02 levels are responsible for 
steady rises in air and ocean temperatures over 
that period, particularly in the last decade. This 
change is resulting in a host of negative conse-
quences: the melting of polar ice caps and result-
ing increases in sea levels and risks of cata-
strophic flooding; intense and long-term drough-
ts in many parts of the world; and a rising inci-
dence of destructive cyclones and hurricanes in 
others.” 
“Judged by conventional scientific standards, it 
is premature to conclude that human C02 emis-
sions—so-called ‘greenhouse gasses’—cause 
global warming. For example, global temperatures 
have not risen since 1998, despite significant in-
creases in C02 during that period. In addition, rather 
than shrinking everywhere, glaciers are actually 
growing in some parts of the world, and the amount 
of ice surrounding Antarctica is at the highest level 
since measurements began 30 years ago. . . . Scien-
tists who predict global warming despite these facts 
are relying entirely on computer models. Those 
models extrapolate from observed atmospheric 
conditions existing in the past. The idea that those 
same models will accurately predict temperature in 
a world with a very different conditions—including 
one with substantially increased CO2 in the atmos-
phere—is based on unproven assumptions, not 
scientific evidence. . . .” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nuclear Waste 
Disposal 
 
“Using deep geologic isolation to dispose of 
radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants 
would put human health and the environment 
at risk. The concept seems simple: contain the 
wastes in underground bedrock isolated from 
humans and the biosphere. The problem in prac-
tice is that there is no way to assure that the geo-
logic conditions relied upon to contain the 
wastes won’t change over time. Nor is there any 
way to assure the human materials used to trans-
port wastes to the site, or to contain them inside 
of the isolation facilities, won’t break down, 
releasing radioactivity into the environment. . . . 
These are the sorts of lessons one learns from the 
complex problems that have plagued safety en-
gineering for the space shuttle, but here the costs 
of failure are simply too high. 
“Radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants 
can be disposed of without danger to the public 
or the environment through deep geologic isola-
tion. In this method, radioactive wastes are stored 
deep underground in bedrock, and isolated from the 
biosphere for many thousands of years. Natural 
bedrock isolation has safely contained the radioac-
tive products generated by spontaneous nuclear 
fission reactions in Oklo, Africa, for some 2 billion 
years. Man-made geologic isolation facilities rein-
force this level of protection through the use of 
sealed containers made of materials known to resist 
corrosion and decay. This design philosophy, 
known as ‘defense in depth,’ makes long-term dis-
posal safe, effective, and economically feasible.” 
 
 
 
 
Concealed Fire-
arms 
“So-called ‘concealed carry’ laws increase
violent crime. The claim that allowing people to 
carry concealed handguns reduces crime is not 
only contrary to common-sense, but also unsup-
ported by the evidence. . . . Looking at data from 
1977 to 2005, the 22 states that prohibited carry-
ing handguns in public went from having the 
highest rates of rape and property offenses to 
having the lowest rates of those crimes. . . .To 
put an economic price tag on the issue, I estimate 
that the cost of “concealed carry laws” is around 
$500 million a year in the U.S.” 
“Overall, ‘concealed carry’ laws decrease violent 
crime. The reason is simple: potential criminals are 
less likely to engage in violent assaults or robberies 
if they think their victims, or others in a position to 
give aid to those persons, might be carrying wea-
pons. . . . Based on data from 1977 to 2005, I esti-
mate that states without such laws, as a group, 
would have avoided 1,570 murders; 4,177 rapes; 
and 60,000 aggravated assaults per year if they had 
made it legal for law-abiding citizens to carry con-
cealed handguns. Economically speaking, the an-
nual gain to the U.S. from allowing concealed 
handguns is at least $6.214 billion.” 
 
Figure 2. Book excerpts attributed to fictional authors. One of two opposing excerpts were randomly assigned to 
fictional authors (Figure 1) whose expertise was evaluated by subjects. 
Here too we did not form precise estimates of size of these effects. We did not anticipate, neces-
sarily, that majorities of either subjects with a hierarchical and individualistic worldview or ones with an 
egalitarian and communitarian worldview would reject the proposition that the pictured author was an 
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expert in the conditions in which the author was depicted as taking the position contrary to the one asso-
ciated with their respective predispositions. However, we anticipated that manipulation of author posi-
tions would result in changes in the likelihood of agreement, within and across culturally defined groups, 
large enough to be considered practically and not merely statistically significant—ones that if observed in 
real-world settings would plausibly be expected to generate noticeable and consequential levels of disa-
greements among persons of diverse values.  
3.2.4. Covariates 
Data were collected on a full range of additional demographic characteristics, including gender, 
race, education level, income, political ideology, and party affiliation. It was anticipated that these va-
riables would be used in controls in multivariate testing of the results of the two study components. 
3.2.5. Statistical Analyses, Power, and Missing Data 
We anticipated analyzing results of both study components in two steps. The first would consist 
of preliminary analyses of response frequencies across culturally defined groups. To enable comparison 
of the groups most pertinent to the study hypotheses, subjects whose cultural worldview scores placed 
them in the top half of both the Hierarchy and Individualism scales were designated “hierarchical indivi-
dualists,” and those whose scores placed in the bottom half of both were designated “egalitarian commu-
nitarians.”  
In the second step, multivariate analyses, including multinomial and ordered logistical regression, 
were to be used for more definitive testing of the study hypotheses. In these analyses, we planned to use 
the culture scales as continuous predictors of variance across the sample as a whole in order to maximize 
statistical power (Judd, 2000, p. 372; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003, p. 86).  To measure the hypothesized effect 
of relevant combinations of cultural worldviews, a product interaction term, Hierarchy x Individualism, 
was created  (Aiken, West & Reno 1991). We anticipated performing Monte Carlo simulations, based on 
the regression analyses, to estimate the effects of holding either hierarchical and individualistic values or 
egalitarian and communitarian ones (Gellman & Hill 2007; King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000). The size of 
the sample furnished adequate power to detect even small effect sizes (e.g., r = .10) with a probability 
well over .80 at p ≤ .05 (Cohen 1988). As a result, findings of nonsignificance could be equated with lack 
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of effect with low risk of Type II error (Streiner, 2003). To facilitate multivariate regression, missing data 
were replaced by multiple imputation (Rubin 2004; King, Honaker, Joseph & Scheve 2001). 
4. Results 
4.1. Correlational Component of the Study 
4.1.1. Simple Frequencies 
Preliminary analyses of the correlational component are reported in Figure 3 and Figure 4. A ma-
jority—55%—of the subjects reported perceiving that a majority of expert scientists agree that global 
temperatures are rising, while 33% reported perceiving division; on whether humans are causing global 
warming, 45% perceived that expert scientific agreement with that proposition, while 40% reported per-
ceiving that scientists were divided. Pluralities perceived that experts were divided on the safety of geo-
logic isolation of nuclear wastes (46%) and the crime-reducing impact of concealed carry laws (41%), 
with roughly a quarter (25%, 26%, respectively) perceiving scientific agreement with those positions 
roughly a third (29% and 33%, respectively) perceiving that most expert scientists disagree with them. 
55%
45%
25% 26%
12%
15%
29%
33%33%
40%
46%
41%
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Figure 3. Overall sample frequencies on perceptions of scientific opinion. N = 1491-1498. Bars indicate percen-
tage of subjects who selected “most expert scientists agree,” “most expert scientists disagree,” and “expert scientists 
are divided in their views” on indicated risk position. 
Disagreement was sharp among individuals identified (through median splits along both dimen-
sions of cultural worldview) as “hierarchical individualists,” on the one hand, and “egalitarian communi-
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tarians,” on the other. Solid majorities of egalitarian communitarians perceived that most expert scientists 
agree that global warming is occurring (78%) and that it has an anthropogenic source (68%). In contrast, 
56% of hierarchical individualists believe that scientists are divided, and another 25% (as opposed to 2% 
for egalitarian communitarians) that most expert scientists disagree that global temperatures are increas-
ing. Likewise, a majority of hierarchical individualists, 55%, believed that most expert scientists are di-
vided on whether humans are causing global warming, with another 32% perceiving that most expert 
scientists disagree with this conclusion. These patterns conformed to the study hypotheses. 
The cultural division on perceptions of expert opinion on concealed carry laws also conformed to 
the study hypotheses. A plurality of hierarchical individualists (47%) perceived that most expert scientists 
agree, a plurality of egalitarian communitarians (47%) that most expert scientists disagree, that permitting 
citizens to carry handguns in public reduces crime. Only 10% of hierarchical individualists perceived that 
expert scientists disagree with this position, and only 12% of egalitarian communitarians that they agree 
with it. Comparable proportions of both types (hierarchical individualists, 40%; egalitarian communita-
rians, 42%) perceived that expert scientists are divided on this issue. 
-15- 
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Figure 4. Frequencies by culture type on perceptions of scientific opinion. N = 746-749. Bars indicate percen-
tage of subjects of specified combination of cultural worldviews (as determined by subjects’ scores on Hierarchy 
and Individualism relative to sample medians) who selected “most expert scientists agree,” “most expert scientists 
disagree,” and “expert scientists are divided in their views” on indicated risk position. 
On the safety of geologic isolation of nuclear wastes, a plurality of both hierarchical individual-
ists (45%) and egalitarian communitarians (45%) perceived that expert scientists are divided. Consistent 
with the study hypotheses, however, varying proportions of each type reported perceiving scientific con-
sensus on one or the other side of this debate. Thus, egalitarian communitarians were about twice as likely 
as hierarchical individualists (35% to 17%) to report that “most expert scientists disagree,” and only a 
little more than half as likely (20% to 37%) to report that “most expert scientists agree,” that geologic iso-
lation of nuclear wastes is safe. 
4.1.2. Multivariate Analyses 
The results of the correlational part of the study were more systematically assessed through a set 
of multinomial logistic regression analyses (Table 1). In each, the response to the scientific opinion meas-
ure for the specified risk item was regressed against two sets of variables: first, the covariates selected as 
control variables; and second, those covariates plus Hierarchy, Individualism, and the interaction term 
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Hierarchy x Individualism. The cultural variables were entered into the analyses as a block because the 
study hypotheses posited that Hierarchy and Individualism would influence perceptions jointly (through 
their sum and interaction) rather than independently of one another (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, pp. 
162-70, 2003). 
The significant G-statistic associated with the second step of each regression analysis indicates 
that subjects’ cultural worldviews explain a statistically significant degree of variation in their responses 
holding the covariates constant (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, pp. 504-05, 508-09, 2003). It is difficult, 
however, to determine the fit between the multivariate analyses and the study hypotheses from the face of 
the regression output. The sign and effect of the cultural variables—which must be aggregated in a man-
ner that reflects the hypotheses—cannot be readily inferred from simple examination of the coefficients 
for the two cultural variables and the product interaction term. Moreover, the regression outputs reflect 
only the impact of the cultural variables on “most expert scientists disagree” and “expert scientists are 
divided” responses, respectively, relative to the baseline response, “most experts agree”; the study hypo-
theses also require assessing the impact of cultural worldviews on the “most agree” and “divided” res-
ponses relative to one another. The most straightforward way to discern the nature of all of these effects 
and to assess their statistical and practical significance is through statistical simulation based on the re-
gressions (Gellman & Hill, pp. 141-42, 2007; King, Tomz, & Wittenberg 2000). 
Simulation results are reflected in Figure 5. The results reflect how much more likely, all else 
equal, a subject with one combination of cultural values is to select the indicated response than is a sub-
ject with the opposing combination (determined by simulating responses when the relevant cultural 
worldview predictors are set one standard deviation from the mean in the indicated directions; the product 
interaction terms to the corresponding values; and all other predictors to their means (Gellman & Hill, pp. 
178-81, 2007)). Thus, holding other influences constant, being simultaneously hierarchical and individua-
listic as opposed to simultaneously egalitarian and communitarian results in a decrease of 56.9 percentage 
points (± 8.5 percentage points) in the likelihood that an individual will perceive that “most expert scien-
tists agree” that “[g]lobal temperatures are increasing.”  A person holding hierarchical and individualistic 
outlooks is 59.2 percentage points more likely (± 8.2) than one holding egalitarian and communitarian 
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outlooks to perceive that “most expert scientists agree” that “[h]uman activity is causing global warm-
ing.” Being hierarchical and individualistic also predicts a significantly greater likelihood in perceiving 
that “most expert scientists disagree” or are “divided” on these questions. These results are consistent 
with the study hypotheses. 
Pct. Point Difference in Likelihood of Selecting Response
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Egalitarian Communitarian
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Figure 5. Differential impact of cultural worldviews on perceptions of expert consensus. N = 1500. Derived 
from multinomial regression analysis (Table 1). Bars indicate how much more likely a subject with the indicated 
worldview is than a subject with the opposing worldview to select indicated response (holding other individual cha-
racteristics constant). Cultural worldviews reflect values one standard deviation from the mean in the indicated di-
rections on the “hierarchy-egalitarian” and “individualist-communitarian” scales. Confidence intervals reflect .95 
level of confidence.  
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 GWREAL GWHUMAN NUKE GUN 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Most Expert Scientists Disagree               
Male (vs. Female) .39 (.19) .00 (.20) .21 (.18) -.17 (.19) -.81 (.15) -.70 (.15) -.80 (.16) -.62 (.16)
White (vs. Black) .01 (.37) -1.07 (.41) -.07 (.31) -1.04 (.34) .07 (.24) .35 (.25) .12 (.26) .67 (.28)
Nonwhite (vs. Black) .07 (.41) -.72 (.44) .05 (.35) -.62 (.37) .09 (.28) .30 (.29) .57 (.31) .97 (.32)
Age .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01)
Household Income .06 (.03) .02 (.03) .05 (.03) .02 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.03 (.03) -.01 (.03)
Education -.13 (.07) -.09 (.07) -.19 (.07) -.13 (.07) -.01 (.06) -.04 (.06) .18 (.06) .14 (.06)
No Religion (vs. some) .28 (.27) .33 (.28) -.34 (.26) -.32 (.27) .16 (.20) .13 (.20) .36 (.22) .36 (.22)
Church Attendance .19 (.08) .17 (.08) .13 (.07) .12 (.08) -.08 (.07) -.06 (.07) -.06 (.07) -.05 (.07)
Democrat (vs. Repub) -.26 (.23) -.17 (.24) -.20 (.23) -.07 (.24) .15 (.21) .10 (.21) .19 (.21) .10 (.22)
Ind. (vs. Repub) .35 (.35) .44 (.37) .51 (.33) .57 (.37) -.10 (.35) -.15 (.35) -.75 (.36) -.78 (.37)
Other Party (vs. Repub) -1.23 (.32) -.76 (.35) -.93 (.28) -.36 (.31) .28 (.24) .10 (.24) .79 (.24) .37 (.25)
Lib => Conservative .87 (.11) .41 (.13) .77 (.10) .30 (.11) -.25 (.09) -.07 (.10) -.64 (.09) -.33 (.10)
Hierarch   1.16 (.70) .49 (.61)  .10 (.42) -.65 (.47)
Individ   .24 (.75) -.20 (.63)  .50 (.42) -.37 (.47)
Hierarch x Individ   .05 (.13) .16 (.11)  -.11 (.08) -.02 (.09)
Expert Scientists Divided                
Male (vs. Female) .29 (.13) .00 (.00) .17 (.13) -.04 (.13) -.57 (.14) -.49 (.14) -.74 (.14) -.60 (.15)
White (vs. Black) .19 (.22) .06 (.14) .08 (.20) -.42 (.21) .25 (.23) .42 (.24) -.14 (.25) .28 (.27)
Nonwhite (vs. Black) -.13 (.26) -.35 (.23) -.11 (.24) -.42 (.24) .10 (.27) .25 (.27) .15 (.30) .46 (.31)
Age .01 (.00) -.49 (.26) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.01)
Household Income .03 (.02) .00 (.00) .02 (.02) .00 (.02) -.05 (.02) -.05 (.02) -.01 (.02) .00 (.02)
Education -.10 (.05) .01 (.02) -.07 (.05) -.02 (.05) .04 (.05) .03 (.05) .13 (.05) .11 (.05)
No Religion (vs. some) .31 (.17) -.06 (.05) .10 (.16) .14 (.17) .32 (.19) .31 (.19) .48 (.20) .49 (.21)
Church Attendance .13 (.06) .39 (.18) .06 (.06) .06 (.06) .02 (.06) .03 (.06) -.03 (.06) -.03 (.06)
Democrat (vs. Repub) -.36 (.17) .13 (.06) -.47 (.18) -.32 (.19) .06 (.18) .05 (.18) -.02 (.18) -.04 (.18)
Ind (vs. Repub) -.09 (.29) -.25 (.18) -.43 (.31) -.35 (.33) .12 (.28) .08 (.28) -.45 (.29) -.45 (.29)
Other Party (vs. Repub) -.90 (.19) -.05 (.31) -1.08 (.20) -.66 (.21) -.08 (.21) -.14 (.22) .18 (.22) -.03 (.23)
Lib => Conservative .48 (.07) -.51 (.21) .41 (.07) .11 (.08) -.23 (.08) -.13 (.09) -.42 (.08) -.21 (.09)
Hierarch   .17 (.09) .35 (.36)  .42 (.39) -.42 (.45)
Individ   -.10 (.40) .06 (.35)  .73 (.40) -.14 (.45)
Hierarch x Individ   -.45 (.40) .09 (.07)  -.14 (.08) -.02 (.08)
Log likelihood ratio χ2  387.80  534.85 345.84 503.49 101.71 127.98 284.68 348.33
G-test (Δ likelihood ratio χ2)  147.05 157.65  26.27 63.65
 
Table 1. Multinomial regression analysis of influences on perceptions of expert consensus. N = 1500. Outcome variable is three-response measure: “most expert scientists agree,” “most expert scientists disagree,” and 
“scientists are divided.” Predictor estimates are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regression coefficients indicate the contribution each predictor variable makes to the likelihood that a 
subject will select “most expert scientists disagree” or “scientists are divided,” respectively, as opposed to “most scientists agree.” Bolded typeface indicates predictor coefficient, model χ2, or G-statistic (incremental change 
in model χ2 associated with additional predictors) is statistically significant at p < 0.05.  
  
 
The simulation results for perceptions of scientific opinion on concealed handguns also fit the 
study hypotheses. Being egalitarian and communitarian predicted a 30.9 percentage-point increase (± 9.1) 
in the likelihood of perceiving that “most expert scientists agree” that “[p]ermitting adults without crimi-
nal records or histories of mental illness to carry concealed handguns in public decreases violent crime,” 
and a 30.1 percentage-point decrease (± 9.7) in perceiving that “most disagree,” relative to being hierar-
chical and individualistic. Again the difference in the perception that scientists are “divided” was not sig-
nificant. 
The significant difference in perceptions of expert consensus on nuclear waste disposal also per-
sisted in the multivariate analysis. Being simultaneously hierarchical and individualistic predicts a 12.6 
percentage-point increase (± 9.2) in the likelihood of perceiving “most expert scientists agree” that 
“[r]adioactive wastes from nuclear power can be safely disposed of in deep underground storage facili-
ties,” and a 14.8 percentage-point decrease (± 9.2) in the likelihood of perceiving that “most disagree.” 
The difference in the predicted likelihood of perceiving that scientists are “divided” is not statistically (or 
practically) significant. Although clearly less dramatic in magnitude than the differences observed for 
perceptions of scientific opinion on climate change and concealed carry laws, the effects of cultural out-
looks on perceptions of scientific opinion for nuclear waste disposal evidence a practically meaningful 
level of disagreement and conform to the hypothesized impact of holding either hierarchic and individua-
listic or egalitarian and communitarian worldviews. 
4.2. Experimental Component of the Study 
4.2.1. Simple Frequencies 
Preliminary analyses of the experimental component are reported in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Figure 
6 reports the overall sample frequencies, which show that a majority of subjects agreed that each of the 
pictured authors was a “trustworthy and knowledgeable expert.” 
 Figure 7 presents frequencies of subjects identified by cultural type. The results again confirmed 
study hypotheses. 
 
-20- 
  
62%
68%
76%
69%
55%
65%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Author’s Position
Climate Change Nuclear Waste Disposal Concealed Carry 
Pc
t. 
A
gr
ee
in
g 
A
ut
or
 Is
 E
xp
er
t
High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low RiskHigh Risk Low Risk
 
Figure 6. Overall sample frequencies on author expertise. N = 1492-1495. Bars indicate percentage of subjects 
who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) that the depicted author was a “trustworthy and know-
ledgeable expert” when assigned indicated position. 
On global warming, the position imputed to the putative expert dramatically affected the res-
ponses of both hierarchical individualists and egalitarian communitarians. Eighty-eight percent of egalita-
rian communitarians, but only 23% of hierarchical individualists, agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” 
or “strongly”) that the depicted author was a “trustworthy and knowledgeable expert” when the author 
was presented as supporting the “high risk” position. In contrast, when the depicted author was presented 
as supporting the “low risk” position, the proportion of hierarchical individualists who agreed the author 
was an expert climbed to 86%, whereas the proportion of egalitarian communitarians who agreed dropped 
to 47%.  
The results were similar for the concealed-carry-law expert. When the depicted author was as-
signed the “high risk” position, egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individualists were divided 
80% to 23% on whether he was an expert. Agreement was again substantially higher among hierarchical 
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individualists (85%) and substantially lower among egalitarian communitarians (50%) when the author 
was assigned the “low risk” position. 
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Figure 7. Frequencies by culture type on author expertise. N = 745-749. Bars indicate percentage of subjects of 
specified combination of cultural worldviews (as determined by subjects’ scores on Hierarchy and Individualism 
relative to sample medians) who agreed (either “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly”) that the depicted author was 
a “trustworthy and knowledgeable expert” when assigned indicated position. 
On nuclear waste disposal, the basic pattern was the same but less pronounced. egalitarian com-
munitarians were more likely—by a margin of 84% to 61%—to perceive that the author was a “trustwor-
thy and knowledgeable expert” when he was assigned the “high risk” position, whereas hierarchical indi-
vidualists were more likely—by a margin of 78% to 57%—to agree when the author was assigned the 
“low risk” position. 
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 Global Warming Nuclear Waste Disposal Concealed Carry 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Risk (0=low risk, 1=high) -.31 (.09) -.32 (.09) 8.72 (2.78) .40 (.09) .40 (.09) 2.41 (2.75) -.47 (.09) -.47 (.09) 1.57 (2.69)
Male (vs. Female)   -.21 (.10) -.18 (.10) -.07 (.10) .00 (.10) -.07 (.10) -.12 (.10)
White (vs. Black)   -.22 (.15) -.07 (.16) .11 (.16) .19 (.16) .13 (.15) .09 (.16)
Nonwhite (vs. Black)   -.04 (.18) .23 (.18) -.02 (.18) .05 (.18) .14 (.18) .07 (.18)
Age   .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00)
Household Income   .01 (.02) .01 (.02) -.02 (.01) -.01 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.02)
Education   .02 (.04) -.01 (.04) .05 (.04) .02 (.04) -.05 (.04) -.03 (.04)
No Religion (vs. some)   -.15 (.12) -.09 (.13) .05 (.13) .06 (.13) -.13 (.12) -.08 (.13)
Church Attendance   -.06 (.04) -.07 (.04) -.04 (.04) -.04 (.04) .00 (.04) -.04 (.04)
Democrat (vs. Repub)   .16 (.14) .01 (.14) .17 (.13) .18 (.13) .10 (.13) .07 (.14)
Independent (vs. Repub)   .28 (.22) .31 (.22) .38 (.22) .25 (.21) .59 (.23) .53 (.24)
Other Party (vs. Repub)   .25 (.14) .23 (.15) .30 (.15) .33 (.15) .30 (.15) .37 (.15)
Liberal => Conservative   .05 (.06) .11 (.07) .08 (.05) .14 (.06) -.02 (.05) .00 (.06)
Hierarch    .20 (.37) .03 (.36) .25 (.38)
Individ    -.17 (.36) -.15 (.35) -.02 (.37)
Hierarch x Individ    .16 (.07) .07 (.07) .14 (.07)
Hierarch x Risk    -.47 (.54) .00 (.53) -.92 (.52)
Individ x Risk    .24 (.53) .61 (.52) -.54 (.51)
Hierarch x Individ x Risk    -.32 (.10) -.20 (.10) -.16 (.10)
LR χ2  11.20  29.74 618.72 18.50 31.60 172.69 25.84 46.33 499.60
G-test (delta LR χ2)   18.54 588.98 13.10 141.09 2.49 453.27
 
Table 2. Ordered logistic regression analysis of experiment results. N = 1500. Outcome variables are 6-point measure of disagreement-agreement with the statement that “I 
believe the author is a trustworthy and knowledgeable expert on” the indicated issue. Predictor estimates are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bolded typeface 
indicates predictor coefficient, model χ2, or G-statistic (incremental change in model χ2 associated with additional predictors) is statistically significant at p < 0.05.  
  
For two of the three risks (global warming, and concealed carry), the impact of the experimental 
manipulation was largest for hierarchical individualists (for nuclear waste disposal it was the same for 
both groups). Nevertheless, consistent with the hypotheses, the position attributed to the authors also had 
substantial effects on egalitarian communitarians, whose likelihood of agreement in the “low risk” condi-
tion was always lower than it was in the “high risk” condition. 
4.2.2. Multivariate Analyses 
Table 2 presents a set of ordered logistic regression analyses performed to enable a more exacting 
test of the experiment hypotheses. Assessment of expertise for each fictional author was regressed against 
predictors in three steps. The first consisted simply of a dummy variable (Risk), coded 0 for “low risk” 
and 1 for “high risk.” The results thus reflect the main effect of the experimental manipulation. As re-
flected in the response frequencies, being assigned to the “high risk” treatment predicted a significant in-
crease in the likelihood of agreeing that the author who addressed nuclear waste disposal was an expert, 
whereas being assigned to the “high risk” treatment predicted a decrease in the likelihood of agreeing the 
authors who addressed climate change and gun control were experts. 
In the second and third steps, the control variables and the cultural worldview variables were en-
tered into the analyses. In addition to the product interaction term for Hierarchy and Individualism (Hie-
rarch x Individ), the third step contains product interaction terms for each culture variable and the expe-
rimental treatment variable (Hierarch x Risk and Individ x Risk) and a three-way product interaction term 
for the cultural variables together and the experimental treatment variable (Hierarch x Indvid x Risk); 
these terms measure individual differences in the response to the experimental manipulation associated 
with subjects’ cultural worldviews. Again, the cultural variables (and the associated interaction terms) 
were entered in as a block because the study hypotheses contemplated effects from the sum and interac-
tion of Hierarchy and Individualism.4 The significant G-statistic associated with the third step in each 
                                       
 
4 In the full specified models, the coefficient for Risk was positive and significant for all three authors. However, 
because the coefficient for Risk in those models indicates the effect of assigning the author the “high risk” position 
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model indicates that addition of the cultural variables explains additional variance in subjects responses. 
In addition, the negative sign of the coefficients for the 3-way interaction terms indicate that the more 
hierarchical and individualistic the subject is, the more the likelihood decreases that she will agree that the 
authors are experts when they are depicted as reaching the “high risk” conclusion. Again, however, the 
most straightforward and informative way to assess the sign, the size, and the significance (statistical and 
practical) of effect of the culture variables is through statistical simulation. 
Simulation results are reported in Figure 8. They reflect how much more likely, all else equal, a 
subject with one combination of values is than the other to agree that the indicated author is a “trustwor-
thy and knowledgeable expert” (determined by simulating responses when the relevant cultural 
worldview predictors are set one standard deviation from the mean in the indicated directions; the expe-
rimental condition variable at either low or high risk; the product interaction terms to the appropriate cor-
responding values; and all other predictors in the regression model to their means (Gellman & Hill, pp. 
178-81, 2007)).  
The results are consistent with the study hypotheses. When the author is assigned a “high risk” 
position, being simultaneously egalitarian and communitarian predicts a substantially greater likelihood 
the author will be perceived as an expert than does being simultaneously hierarchical and individualistic 
(other influences held constant); similarly, when the author is assigned a “low risk” prediction, being si-
multaneously hierarchical and individualist predicts a substantially greater likelihood the author will be 
perceived as an expert than does being simultaneously egalitarian and communitarian. Once more, the 
effects are most dramatic for the climate change and gun control authors, but remains significant—
statistically and practically—for the nuclear-waste-disposal author: whereas being simultaneously hierar-
chical and individualistic as opposed to simultaneously egalitarian and communitarian predicts a 31.2 
(± 8.7) percentage-point greater likelihood of perceiving the author to be an expert in the “low risk” con-
dition, it predicts a 21.5 (± 9.3) percentage-point lower likelihood of such a perception in the “high risk” 
                                                                                                                           
 
when Hierarchy and Individualism have values of 0—a score outside the range of the scale—the coefficient does not 
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condition—or a 50 percentage-point shift in the difference in likelihoods overall as a result of the experi-
mental manipulation. 
Pct. Point Difference in Likelihood of Selecting Response
60%     40%    20%      0      20%     40%    60%
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Figure 8. Impact of authors’ positions on the perception of his expertise by subjects of diverse cultural pre-
dispositions. N = 1,500. Derived from ordered logistic regression analysis (Table 2). Bars indicate how much more 
likely a subject with the indicated worldview is to agree than is a subject with the opposing worldview that the au-
thor is a “knowledgeable and trustworthy expert” when that author is assigned a particular position (“high” or “low 
risk”). Cultural worldview values have been set one standard deviation from the mean in the indicated directions on 
the “hierarchy-egalitarian” and “individualist-communitarian” worldview scales. Confidence intervals reflect .95 
level of confidence. 
                                                                                                                           
admit of meaningful interpretation on its own (Aiken, West & Reno, p. 38, 1991). 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1. Summary of Findings 
The goal of the study was to examine a distinctive explanation for the failure of members of the 
public to form beliefs consistent with apparent scientific consensus on climate change and other issues of 
risk. We hypothesized that scientific opinion fails to quiet societal dispute on such issues not because 
members of the public are unwilling to defer to experts but because culturally diverse persons tend to 
form opposing perceptions of what experts believe. Individuals systematically overestimate the degree of 
scientific support for positions they are culturally predisposed to accept as a result of a cultural availabili-
ty effect that influences how readily they can recall instances of expert endorsement of those positions.  
The study furnished two forms of evidence in support of this basic hypothesis. The first was the 
existence of a strong correlation between individuals’ cultural values and their perceptions of scientific 
consensus on risks known to divide persons of opposing worldviews. Subjects holding hierarchical and 
individualistic outlooks, on the one hand, and ones holding egalitarian and communitarian outlooks, on 
the other, significantly disagreed about the state of expert opinion on climate change, nuclear waste dis-
posal, and handgun regulation. It is possible, of course, that one or the other of these groups is better at 
discerning scientific consensus than the other. But because the impressions of both groups converged and 
diverged from positions endorsed in NAS “expert consensus” reports in a pattern reflective of their re-
spective predispositions, it seems more likely that both hierarchical individualists and egalitarian commu-
nitarians are fitting their perceptions of scientific consensus to their values. 
The second finding identified a mechanism that could explain this effect. When asked to evaluate 
whether an individual of elite academic credentials, including membership in the NAS, was a “knowled-
geable and trustworthy expert,” subjects’ answers proved conditional on the fit between the position the 
putative expert was depicted as adopting (on climate change, on nuclear waste disposal, or on handgun 
regulation) and the position associated with the subjects’ cultural outlooks. 
The size of the effects was not uniform across the types of risks examined. The largest disparity 
occurred in connection with global warming; differences in perceptions of consensus, and in the impact of 
authors’ positions in the experiment, were smallest for nuclear power, and of intermediate size for con-
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cealed carry laws. The study furnishes no particular insight into the source of these differences. We spe-
culate that they reflect the relative contemporary centrality of these issues as sources of political conflict, 
and the absence of nuclear power construction in the United States over the last two decades in particular.  
Even in the case of nuclear power, however, the differences in the magnitude of the observed ef-
fect were statistically significant and large enough in magnitude, we submit, to be of practical importance. 
For example, multivariate analysis of the experiment results revealed that (all else equal) the gap between 
the predicted likelihood that a modestly hierarchical, individualistic subject would see the author as an 
expert, on the one hand, and the likelihood that a modestly one would, on the other, shifted by over 50-
percentage points when the author’s position was manipulated from “high risk” to “low.” 
A disparity of this magnitude in how much more likely one is to count some as “experts” those 
who endorse rather than opposes one’s cultural predisposition would over time naturally lead to a cultu-
rally skewed impression of what most experts believe. Even when experts by and large agree, individuals 
of diverse worldviews can be expected under such conditions to end up with substantially different as-
sessments of the state of scientific consensus. 
5.2. Understanding the Cultural Cognition of Risk 
Adding this dynamic to the set of mechanisms through which cultural cognition shapes percep-
tions of risk and related facts, it is possible to envision a more complete picture of how these processes 
work in concert. On this view, cultural cognition can be seen as injecting a biasing form of endogeneity 
into a process roughly akin to Bayesian updating. 
Even as an idealized normative model of rational decisionmaking, Bayesian information 
processing is necessarily incomplete. Bayesianism furnishes an algorithm for rationally updating one’s 
beliefs in light of new evidence: one’s estimate of the likelihood of some proposition should be revised in 
proportion to the probative weight of any new evidence (by multiplying one’s “prior odds” by a “likelih-
ood ratio” that represents how much more consistent new evidence is with that proposition than with its 
negation) (Raiffa 1968). This instruction, however, merely tells a person how a prior estimate and new 
evidence of a particular degree of probity should be combined to produce a revised estimate; it has noth-
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ing to say about what her prior estimate should be or, even more importantly, how she should determine 
the probative force (if any) of a putatively new piece of evidence. 
Consistently with Bayesianism, an individual can use pretty much any process she wants—
including some prior application of the Bayesian algorithm itself—to determine the probity of new evi-
dence (Raiffa 1968), but any process that gauges the weight (or likelihood ratio) of the new evidence 
based on its consistency with the individual’s prior estimate of the proposition in question will run into an 
obvious difficulty. In the extreme, an individual might adopt the rule that she will assign no probative 
weight to any asserted piece of evidence that contradicts her prior belief. If she does that, she will of 
course never change her mind and hence never revise a mistaken belief, since she will necessarily dismiss 
all contrary evidence, no matter how well founded, as lacking credibility. In a less extreme variant, an 
individual might decide merely to assign new information that contradicts her prior belief less probative 
weight than she otherwise would have; in that case, a person who starts with a mistaken belief might 
eventually correct it, but only after being furnished with more evidence than would have been necessary if 
she had not discounted any particular item of contrary evidence based on her mistaken starting point. A 
person who employs Bayesian updating is more likely to correct a mistaken belief, and to do so sooner, if 
she has a reliable basis exogenous to her prior belief for identifying the probative force of evidence that 
contravenes that belief (Rabin & Schrag 1999). 
When mechanisms of cultural cognition figure in her reasoning, a person processes information in 
a manner that is equivalent to one who is assigning new information probative weigh based on its consis-
tency with her prior estimation (Figure 9). Because of identity protective cognition (Sherman & Cohen 
2006; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007) and affect (Peters, Burraston & Mertz 2004), such a 
person is highly likely to start with a risk perception that is associated with her cultural values. She might 
resolve to evaluate the strength of contrary evidence without reference to her prior beliefs. However, be-
cause of culturally biased information search and culturally biased assimilation (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, 
Cohen & Slovic 2009), she is likely to attend to the information in a way that reinforces her prior beliefs 
and affective orientation (Jenkins-Smith 2001). 
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Figure 9. Risk perception updating and the effect of cultural cognition. How readily individuals will revise their 
perceptions of risk depends on their “learning aptitude”—that is, their motivation and capacity to seek out new in-
formation, to recognize it as such, and to give it appropriate effect (A). If their learning aptitude is guided by their 
existing perceptions—that is, if they are motivated to seek out new information that affirms their prior risk percep-
tions, and selectively to recognize and give effect to new information in a manner that reinforces their priors—
individuals will exhibit closed-mindedness (B) (Rabin & Schrag 1999). Individuals are vulnerable to this form of 
closed-mindedness as a result of cultural cognition insofar as the same cultural predispositions that shape their prior 
risk perceptions also motivate their search for new information and their recognition and assimilation of it (C).  
Perhaps mindful of the limits of her ability to gather and interpret evidence on her own, such an 
individual might choose to defer or to give considerable weight to the views of experts. But through the 
cultural availability effect examined in our study, she is likely to overestimate the proportion of experts 
who hold the view consistent with her own predispositions. Like the closed-minded Bayesian whose as-
sessment of the probative value of new information is endogenous to his prior beliefs, then, such an indi-
vidual will either not change her mind or will change it much more slowly than she should, because the 
same predisposition that informs her priors will also be unconsciously shaping her ability to recognize 
and assign weight to all manner of evidence, including the opinion of scientists (Zimper & Ludwig 2009). 
5.3 Improving Risk Communication 
This conclusion does not imply, however, that there is no prospect for rational public delibera-
tions informed by the best scientific evidence on global warming, nuclear waste disposal, handguns, and 
like issues. But because the source of the enfeebled power of scientific opinion is different from what is 
normally thought, the treatment must be something other than what is normally prescribed. It is not 
enough to assure that scientifically sound information—including evidence of what scientists themselves 
believe—is widely disseminated: cultural cognition strongly motivates individuals—of all worldviews—
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to recognize such information as sound in a selective pattern that reinforces their cultural predispositions. 
To overcome this effect, communicators must attend to the cultural meaning as well as the scientific con-
tent of information.  
Research informed by cultural cognition and related theories is making progress in identifying 
communication strategies that possess this quality. One is identity affirmation. When shown risk informa-
tion (e.g., global temperatures are increasing) that they associate with a conclusion threatening to their 
cultural values (commerce must be constrained), individuals tend to react dismissively toward that infor-
mation; however, when shown that the information in fact supports or is consistent with a conclusion that 
affirms their cultural values (society should rely more on nuclear power), such individuals are more likely 
to consider the information open-mindedly (Kahan 2010; Cohen, Bastardi, Sherman, Hsu, McGoey, 2007; 
Cohen, Aronson & Steele, 2000).  
Another is pluralistic advocacy. Individuals reflexively reject information inconsistent with their 
predispositions when they perceive that it is being advocated by experts whose values they reject and op-
posed by ones whose values they share. In contrast, they attend more open-mindedly to such information, 
and are much more likely to accept it, if they perceive that there are experts of diverse values on both 
sides of the debate (Earle & Cvetkovich 1995; Kahan et al. in press).  
Finally, there is narrative framing. Individuals tend to assimilate information by fitting it to pre-
existing narrative templates or schemes that invest the information with meaning. The elements of these 
narrative templates—the identity of the stock heroes and villains, the nature of their dramatic struggles, 
and the moral stakes of their engagement with one another—vary in identifiable and recurring ways 
across cultural groups. By crafting messages to evoke narrative templates that are culturally congenial to 
target audiences, risk communicators can help to assure that the content of the information they are im-
parting receives considered attention across diverse cultural groups (Earle & Cvetckovich 1995; Jones & 
McBeth 2010). 
Research on these and related strategies for dispelling the tendency of cultural cognition to gener-
ate conflict in public deliberations about risk are at an early stage. Further development of this aspect of 
science communication, we believe, is critical to enlightened democratic policymaking. 
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Appendix. Select Measures from Study Instrument 
1. Cultural Worldview Measures (Rotated) 
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making decisions for 
themselves. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, mod-
erately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree; items prefixed by “C” 
or “E” were reverse coded] 
IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. 
CHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.  
IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.  
IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.  
CPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means li-
miting the freedom and choices of individuals.  
CLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get 
in the way of what's good for society.  
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination. How strongly 
you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly dis-
agree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree] 
HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.  
ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and 
people of color, and men and women.  
EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.  
HREVDIS2. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don't want equal rights, 
they want special rights just for them.  
HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.  
2. Perceptions of Scientific Opinion (items rotated) 
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We’d now like to know what you think expert scientists believe about these issues. We’ll ask you 
to read a series of statements. For each, please indicate whether you think most expert scientists agree 
with the statement, most expert scientists disagree with the statement, or expert scientists are divided in 
their views. 
GWREAL. Global temperatures are increasing. 
GWHUMAN. Human activity is causing global warming. 
NUKE Radioactive wastes from nuclear power can be safely disposed of in deep underground 
storage facilities. 
GUN. Permitting adults without criminal records or histories of mental illness to carry concealed 
handguns in public decreases violent crime. 
3. Perceptions of Scientific Expertise (authors rotated) 
Imagine that a close friend told you he or she was undecided on the issue of [“global warming,” 
“the disposal of nuclear waste,” or “the issue of gun control”]. and would like to get more information. [In 
the case of gun control: “Of particular concern to your friend is the issue of ‘concealed carry laws,’ which 
permit adults without criminal records or histories of mental illness to possess concealed handguns in 
public.”] The friend tells you that he or she is planning to read a book about the issue but before taking 
the time to do so would like to get your opinion on whether the author seems like a knowledgeable and 
trustworthy expert.  
Below is a book excerpt and some information about the book’s author. How strongly would you 
agree or disagree with this statement [Strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly 
agree, moderately agree, strongly agree]: 
“I believe the author is a trustworthy and knowledgeable expert on [global warming, gun control, 
or nuclear power].” 
